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Syndromic Surveillance Using Minimum Transfer of Identifiable
Data: the Example of the National Bioterrorism Syndromic
Surveillance Demonstration Program
Richard Platt, Carmella Bocchino, Blake Caldwell, Robert Harmon, Ken Kleinman,
Ross Lazarus, Andrew F. Nelson, James D. Nordin, and Debra P. Ritzwoller

ABSTRACT Several health plans and other organizations are collaborating with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to develop a syndromic surveillance system
with national coverage that includes more than 20 million people. A principal design
feature of this system is reliance on daily reporting of counts of individuals with syndromes of interest in specified geographic regions rather than reporting of individual
encounter-level information. On request from public health agencies, health plans and
telephone triage services provide additional information regarding individuals who are
part of apparent clusters of illness. This reporting framework has several advantages,
including less sharing of protected health information, less risk that confidential information will be distributed inappropriately, the prospect of better public acceptance,
greater acceptance by health plans, and less effort and cost for both health plans and
public health agencies. If successful, this system will allow any organization with appropriate data to contribute vital information to public health syndromic surveillance
systems while preserving individuals’ privacy to the greatest extent possible.
KEYWORDS Acute disease epidemiology, Ambulatory care, Bioterrorism, Cluster analysis, Disease outbreaks, Human, Medical informatics applications, Medical records systems, Population surveillance methods, Statistics and numerical data, Surveillance.

INTRODUCTION
One potentially valuable source of information for syndromic surveillance is diagnoses assigned during routine ambulatory care, including office visits and nurse
telephone triage lines. Several such systems have been described,1–5 and a national
demonstration project involving multiple health plans and approximately 20 million covered lives is currently being developed. This surveillance system will rely
principally on reporting by health plans to public health agencies of aggregated
(count) data rather than on reporting of encounter-level data. This article presents
a brief description of the program and discusses the reasons for adopting this
method of data sharing.

THE NATIONAL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the American Association of
Health Plans, Harvard Medical School, five health plans or physician groups (Harvard Pilgrim Health Care/Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates in Massachusetts,
HealthPartners in Minnesota, Kaiser Permanente Colorado, Scott and White Healthcare System in Texas, and the Austin Regional Clinic in Texas), and Optum, a
nationwide consumer health information company, are collaborating to develop a
syndromic surveillance system that will cover more than 20 million individuals with
prepaid health care in all 50 states. The system will use encounter-level data from
routine and urgent office visits to the first five health plans and from the nurse
telephone triage and health information system of the rest.
Although this system is under development, it will be based on one created by
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care/Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates in collaboration with the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.5 That system uses a number of features of the US Department of Defense ESSENCE (Electronic Surveillance
System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics) system,1 plus
other features developed by other organizations, including HealthPartners in Minnesota and Kaiser Permanente Colorado in Denver. The new system will have several appealing features from a public health perspective. First, the fact that the
source population will be known will allow greater flexibility for signal detection
than is possible when only the affected individuals are known. Second, it will use
electronic information that is already collected by the practices, health plans, and
call centers as part of routine operations. Therefore, no clinicians or other health
plan personnel are required to perform any nonroutine assignment of diagnoses,
perform any classification, or initiate daily reporting of syndromic data. The fact
that no additional labor will be required is important for a surveillance system that
is intended to operate permanently. Third, because the information is available
electronically, the incremental cost will be small to extract data of interest, manipulate it, and make it available to public health agencies. A substantial fraction of the
US population and a larger fraction of population centers are covered by one or
more health plans that have some electronic information that could be useful for
this type of surveillance.
The principal features of this surveillance system based on health plans will
include different activities performed by the health plans, a data center, and public
health agencies (Figure). The activities based on the health plans will be (1) annual
or semiannual enumeration of health plan members; (2) assignment of each member
to a geographic area, for instance, census tract or ZIP code; (3) daily or more frequent
creation of a data extract containing new records of encounters with diagnoses of
interest; (4) identification of only new episodes of illness by excluding people who
have had recent encounters with a diagnosis in the same syndrome; (5) assignment
of new episodes to the individual’s ZIP code or census tract; and (6) transmission
to the data center of the counts of new episodes in each area.

FIGURE. Data flow for the National Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance Demonstration Program
of the Centers for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The identification of new episodes and assignment to geographic areas will be
performed using programs provided by the data center. Secure transmission of
count data to the data center will use messaging software provided by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. The health plans will retain the clinical data
extracts on a computer (server) inside their firewall. These extracts contain confidential identifying information that may be required if the event is suspected to be
part of a cluster of illness needing further investigation.
When a cluster is detected, these extracts will be used to generate line lists that
can be sent automatically to the health department in the affected area. These line
lists will contain additional demographic and clinical information, including the
patients’ area of residence, age, sex, recorded temperature, diagnoses assigned, and
diagnostic tests performed. The line lists will not contain the patients’ names, addresses, or other information about the patients’ health care.
The health plans will also designate an individual who will be able to respond
promptly to requests by public health agencies for more information about specific
patients than is contained in the line lists. Note that health plans only provide to
public health authorities information that can be traced to individuals in the unusual event that the individuals are believed to be part of an epidemiologically
important cluster. This system thus will be consistent with other mandated public
health reporting activities.
The data center will maintain information about each health plan’s membership in each geographic region. It also will maintain historical information about
the daily counts of new episodes of each syndrome in each ZIP code or census tract.
Each day, it will combine reports from different health plans (with service areas that
may overlap) to provide a combined total number of episodes in each syndrome in

each area under surveillance. In each area, it will compare the observed number of
new episodes of illness to the expected number, using the historical data and a
variety of modeling techniques, and it will identify areas with an unusual numbers
of events (signals), and report these signals to public health agencies. At the same
time, the data center will instruct the health plan’s data server to send the line
list described above to the designated recipient in the health department who has
responsibility for the geographic region involved.
This method of aggregating reports from multiple health plans with overlapping catchment areas should allow detection of signals that are too weak to be
observed in any single health plan’s data. It also will obviate the need for each health
plan to develop the capacity to report to multiple public health agencies. This is
particularly important for health plans with national or multistate coverage.
Public health agencies will work with the data center to develop an acceptable
reporting format, and they will indicate their preferred thresholds for reporting of
signals that require immediate attention. They will query the designated responders
of the health plans to obtain additional information about the individuals who
contributed to a signal. This reporting sequence will begin differently from usual
reports by clinicians since the first notice to the public health agency will include
only a count of individuals rather than a report from a clinician who is concerned
about one or more specific individuals because of their unusual clinical or historical
features.
With the new system, the epidemiological feature of interest will be the total
number of affected individuals within limited geographic regions; most of these
individuals will have symptoms consistent with common illnesses (e.g., cough or
headache). Many or all of the individuals who contribute to a signal will have benign
explanations for the diagnosis, and clinicians would be unlikely to identify any of
them with reportable illnesses. It is also very likely that moderate clusters of illness
will be detected by this method of aggregation even though most clinicians will see
no more than a single extra symptomatic person.
ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES
This data structure has flexibility that can serve several important purposes. It is
relatively simple to modify the syndrome definitions or to create new syndromes
because the health plans retain diagnosis-level data that can be manipulated by new
programs supplied by the data center. Examples of modifications that may be of
interest are reports involving specific segments of the population, such as children.
It will also be possible to perform ad hoc queries through programs distributed by
the data center; such queries will be subject to the agreement of the health plans.
This ad hoc query capability can be automated so that it can operate essentially in
real time.
DATA-SHARING CONSIDERATIONS
These data-sharing provisions have several advantages compared with a case-based
reporting system. We believe the system based on routine reporting of counts of
ambulatory encounters is simpler, quicker, and less expensive to develop and maintain than an encounter-based system since much of the work of data reduction is
performed by health plans that already possess the encounter-level data. Thus, there

is no need for public health agencies to develop and maintain a separate capability for
receiving many millions of encounter records per year to identify signals of interest.
More important, this system conforms to the general expectation that confidential personal health information will be used as sparingly as possible to accomplish
the mission of the public health agencies. Even if providing encounter-level identified information is permitted by public health reporting law, this will be essentially
new terrain both for the public and for public health agencies since it will affect
nearly every person and because the majority of reported episodes will not involve
a condition that has traditionally been considered to be of public health interest. In
addition, public health agencies will need to develop robust capabilities to keep
confidential the large amount of data they will receive. It is difficult to predict with
confidence the public’s reaction to such broad reporting, but many individuals may
perceive this intensity of reporting of protected health information to be inappropriate. It is worth noting that these concerns may be less important for syndromic
surveillance based in emergency rooms because the number of visits is so much
smaller, a much smaller proportion of the population is directly affected, individual
visits are typically not linked to any other health care the individual receives, and
the proportion of events that may be of public health interest may be higher.
It is possible for health plans to provide individual encounter-level data with
encrypted identifiers. However, developing and maintaining this capacity will entail
considerable investment of human and financial resources by the health plans. Even
without explicit identifiers, like name, date of birth, or address, it is often possible
to identify individuals through patterns of care they receive, particularly in geographic areas with relatively few members of a specific health plan. Techniques
exist to minimize the risk of reidentification, but they are not perfect, and they require
additional investment. It is likely, therefore, that health plans will be slow to join
an encounter-based syndromic reporting system because of their concerns about the
extra work involved and their interest in appearing to their members to be good
stewards of protected health information.
The trade-off for not providing individual-level data routinely is that health
plans must respond promptly to requests for additional information about the individuals represented in the clusters of concern. This responsibility is typically assigned to an individual within the health plan who is authorized to access clinical
information. Because participating health plans are large, such an individual is usually on duty at most times; when not on duty, it is important for such an individual
to be available. Access to the required information is ordinarily straightforward
because it exists in electronic form.
LIMITATIONS
There is no proof that syndromic surveillance will be useful, either for early detection of bioterrorism events or to support other public health activities, although
there is some evidence suggesting that our system provides a valid representation
of seasonal events.4 Even under optimal conditions, syndromic surveillance may
yield insufficient information, such as a diagnosis of cough with no additional clinical data, to allow adequate sensitivity to find events of interest or to find them in
a timely manner. In addition, the specificity may be too low to make this a useful
routine screening activity; even a moderate volume of false alarms may make this
approach unusable on a sustained basis.

It is unclear how a syndromic surveillance system based in an ambulatory setting will perform compared to a system based in emergency rooms. In some circumstances, one would expect the first signal to be observed in the ambulatory setting.
This will be the case if a substantial number of people with relatively mild symptoms seek care. However, the first signal might be detectable in emergency rooms,
for instance, if a smaller number of people become seriously ill more quickly and
use emergency rooms as their first point of contact with the health care system.
Because the demonstration project described here uses medical record information rather than billing data, we expect the accuracy of the information to be as good
as clinicians create in actual practice. Nonetheless, there is likely to be a substantial
amount of misclassification. Inaccuracies in the data are likely to be greater in systems
that use administrative data.
Many logistical issues will need to be addressed for this system to work as
intended. The electronic data created as part of routine care will need to be available promptly and without interruption. Communications links will need to function efficiently between the health plans and the data center and between the data
center and the health departments. Clinician responders in health plans will need
to respond quickly to requests for additional data from health departments.
More generally, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the system described
here can provide information that is as useful for public health purposes as one
that provides encounter information directly to health departments.
Because of the many uncertainties, even a large ambulatory care–based syndromic surveillance system should be considered to provide information that is
complementary to other surveillance systems.
CONCLUSION
Experience in individual health plans indicates that data from medical offices and
telephone triage lines can be a useful component of syndromic surveillance systems.
These have prompted the development of a national demonstration program. A
principal design feature of this system is reporting of counts of individuals with
syndromes of interest in small geographic regions, with retention by the health
plans of individual-level data except in the relatively unusual event of signals that
require follow-up by public health agencies.
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